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researchin automatingtrading strategies byshowcasingalternate approachesin an
open-invitationmarketgame. TACpresentsachallengingtravel-shoppingscenario
where agents must satisfy client preferences for complementary and substitutable
goods by interacting through a variety of market types. Michigan’s entry, Walver-
ine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel
economy. Using this Walrasian model, we construct a decision-theoretic formu-
lation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walverine solves in each round of
bidding for each good. Walverine’s optimal bidding approach, as well as several
other features of its overall strategy, are potentially applicable in a broad class of
trading environments.
￿Revised and extended version of a paper to appear in the Second International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-03).
11 Introduction
The annual Trading Agent Competition(TAC) provides a periodic forum for exploring
the interactionof strategies for a challengingmarket game. The originalmotivationfor
TAC was to encourage agent researchers interested in trading to focus on a common
problem, involvingmultiple interrelated goods traded simultaneously in a strategically
complex setting (Wellman et al., 2001). The TAC series has succeeded in attracting
signiﬁcant participation(approximately20entries per year, a majorityof which clearly
reﬂect a substantial effort), and most importantly, producing a sizable body of ideas
and results, as reﬂected in over a dozen published reports to date.1
After operating the competition for its ﬁrst two years, the University of Michigan
entered TAC for the ﬁrst time in 2002. TAC-02, organized by the Swedish Institute
of Computer Science (SICS), was held in Edmonton, Canada, in July. The ﬁeld of
19 entrants included many strong contenders from the previous year (Wellman et al.,
2003)—several of which were signiﬁcantly improved (Greenwald, 2003a)—as well as
some newcomers.
Our agent, “Walverine”, gets its name from the University of Michigan team mas-
cot (the wolverine—avariety of weasel), and L´ eon Walras, the 19th-centuryeconomist
who ﬁrst envisioned the concept of interacting markets in price equilibrium (Walras,
1954). Walverine’s overall approach can be characterized as “competitive analysis”—
forming expectations based on a model where agents behave competitively (Arrow
and Hahn, 1971). From such assumptions about the other agents’ behavior, Walver-
ine formulates a decision-theoretic model of its bidding problem, and issues its offers
accordingly.
Embodying the competitive analysis approach in a software trading agent has led
us to develop several novel techniques. Although worked out in detail speciﬁcally for
the TAC environment, we expect that the underlying ideas will prove applicable to a
broad range of trading contexts.
2T rading Agent Competition
2.1 TAC Rules
The TAC game presents a travel-shopping task, where traders assemble ﬂights, hotels,
and entertainmentintotripsfora setof eightprobabilisticallygenerated clients. Clients





(hp) they are willing to pay to stay at the “Towers” (T) hotel rather than “Shanties”








￿) for three different types of entertainment
events. The agents’ objective is to maximize the value of trips for their clients, net
of expenditures in the markets for travel goods. The three categories of goods are
exchanged throughdistinct market mechanisms.
Flights.Afeasible tripincludesairtransportationbothways, comprisingan inﬂight
day








￿. Flights in and out each day are sold













￿, and follows a random walk thereafter with an increasingly
upward bias.
Hotels. Feasible trips must also include a room in one of the two hotels for each
night of the client’s stay. There are 16 rooms available in each hotel each night, and
these are sold through ascending 16th-price auctions. Agents submit bids for vari-
ous quantities, specifying the price offered for each additional unit. When the auction
closes, the units are allocated to the 16 highest offers, with all bidders paying the price
of thelowestwinningoffer. Each minute, thehotelauctionsissuequotes, indicatingthe
16th-(ASK) and 17th-highest(BID) prices among the currentlyactive unitoffers (Wur-
man et al., 1998). Starting at minute four, one of the hotel auctions is selected at
random to close, with the others remaining active and open for bids.
Hotel bidders are also subject to a “beat-the-quote” rule (Wurman et al., 2001),
requiringthat any new bid offer to purchase at least one unitat a price of ASK
￿
￿, and
at least as many units at ASK
￿
￿as the agent was previously winningat ASK.
Entertainment. Agents receive an initialrandom allocation of entertainment tickets
(indexed by type and day), which they may allocate to their own clients or sell to other
agents through continuous double auctions (Friedman and Rust, 1993). The entertain-
ment auctions issue BID and ASK quotes representing the highest outstanding buy and
lowest sell offer, respectively, and remain open for buying and selling throughout the
12-minute game duration. A client may sell tickets that it does not own, but must pay
a penalty of 200 per ticket for any “short sales” not covered by the end of the game.
A feasible client trip
￿ is deﬁned by an inﬂight day in
























































At the end of a game instance, the TAC server calculates the optimal allocation of
trips to clients for each agent, given ﬁnal holdingsof ﬂights, hotels, and entertainment.
The agent’s game score is its total client trip utility,minus net expenditures in the TAC
auctions.
2.2 Lessons from Previous TAC Events
In designing Walverine, we had the beneﬁto flearning from two years of observing
the efforts of other TAC agent designers (Stone and Greenwald, 2003; Wellman et al.,
2001). We outline some of the lessons that particularly inﬂuenced our thinking about
the competition.
First, agents are generally quite competent. Our initial game design embedded
several key issues we thought relevant for agent strategy, and despite the lack of prior
discussion, most of the entrants recognized these, and moreover discovered others we
did not anticipate. The second year’s entrants explicitly built on methods disclosed
after the ﬁrst competition, and disclosed these advances as well. Thus, there was good
reason to expect the agents to get better, and that the level of competition would be
especially high in the ﬁnal stage of the tournament.
3Second, agents tend to improve dramatically during the course of the tournament.
At the time of the preliminaryrounds(qualifyingand seeding), entrants are stilldebug-
ging their implementations and reﬁning their designs. Therefore, patterns observed in
early games may not be strong evidence for behavior in the ﬁnals.
Third, calculating optimal allocations and marginal valuations is feasible, and im-
portant (Greenwald and Boyan, 2001; Stone et al., 2001).
Finally, the hotel market is sufﬁciently competitive that depending on prices to be
reasonable without even monitoringthem is a viable strategy. This fact was evidenced
most dramaticallyby thesuccess of livingagents inTAC-01 (Fritschiand Dorer, 2002;
Wellman et al., 2001).
3W alverine Framework
Based on these observations, we decided early in our design process to commit to the
hypothesis that the TAC domain resembles a competitive economy. That is, we take
as a basic presumption that the aggregate behavior of eight trading agents could be
successfully approximated by a model in which each behaves according to the dictates
of perfect competition. This does not mean we literally believe that the agents act as
perfect competitors(theypatentlydo not),nor thatthey should(indeed, Walverine tries
tobehave strategically). Itismerelya modelingassumptionchosen tobalance accuracy
and tractability.
One consequence of adopting a model of this sort is that we did not depend sub-
stantially on empirical data as input to our trading strategy. This is an advantage in
light of the observation above that the preliminary rounds tend to differ qualitatively
from the ﬁnals. Although Walverine does have some free parameters that could have
beneﬁted by tuning for performance, we deliberately resisted this approach in favor of
maintaing a commitment to our analytical models.
3.1 Architecture
Walverine’s functional architecture is depicted in Figure 1. Dividing the agent into
modular components facilitated the development of Walverine’s strategy, as well as its
software realization, especially given the number of programmers involved (all of the
coauthors). We partitioned the bidding decisions into one strategy for ﬂight and hotel
acquisition, and another for entertainment trading. Assuming the availability of only
one direct API connection to the TAC server, we routed all bid messages and query
results through a local proxy standing between SICS and our trading components. An
optimization server answers queries about optimal packages and marginal values to
both strategy components, given information about transactions, and actual and pre-
dicted prices. Although there is no direct communication between the ﬂight/hotel and
entertainment modules, information supplied by each is reﬂected implicitly in the re-
sults of optimizationqueries provided to the other.
The discussion below focuses on ﬂight and hotel bidding, which dominates the
game and exempliﬁes our competitive analysis approach. Walverine’s entertainment
strategy takes a completely different tack, discussed in Section 7.






Figure 1: Walverine architecture.
3.2 Skeletal Trading Strategy
Analysisearly inthe designprocess suggested thatitwas notworthwhiletodelay ﬂight
purchases, as the expected price increase exceeded the likelybeneﬁto fimproved hotel
information by the time hotels begin to close and reveal meaningful prices. Therefore,
Walverine commits to ﬂights as soon as possible, based on an assessment of expected
optimal trips.
Speciﬁcally, upon game start, Walverine retrieves client information and initial
ﬂight prices. It then generates an initialpredictionof hotelprices (details inSection 4),
and calculates the optimal trip at these prices. It then issues bids immediately to pur-
chase the ﬂightsforthese trips. In theTAC-02 ﬁnals, Walverinepurchased all 16ﬂights
within the ﬁrst four seconds of the game, on average.
After the initial ﬂight purchases, decision making is effectively divided into dis-
crete rounds, delimited by the release of hotel price quotes each minute, with one ran-
dom hotel auction closing each minute starting at minute four. Therefore, at 3:00 and
each minute mark thereafter, Walverine executes its ﬂight/hotelbidding-roundroutine,
which comprises the followingsequence of steps:
1. Update price quotes and holdingsfor ﬂights and hotels.
2. Recalculate hotel price predictions based on updated information.
3. Recalculate optimal package, and purchase any indicated ﬂights beyond those
currently held.
4. Calculate marginal values of hotel rooms.
5. Generate hotel bids based on these marginal values.
Price quotes and holding information (transactions) are retrieved directly from the
TAC server. Walverine’s methods for price predictionand bid generation are discussed
in Sections 4 and 6, respectively. Calculating optimal packages and marginal values is
the domain of our optimizationserver, discussed in the next section.
53.3 Optimal Packages and Marginal Values

















































￿ captures the cost of purchasing
any travel goods (ﬂights, hotels, entertainment) required for trips
￿,b e yond the agent’s
holdings, at estimated or actual prices
￿
￿. Unavailable items (i.e., closed hotels) are
considered to have an effective price of
￿.
This optimization problem can be expressed as an integer linear program (Stone
et al., 2001). We formulate the model in AMPL (Fourer et al., 1993), and calculate
results usingthe CPLEX solver.2 Walverine’s optimizationserver wraps thisoptimiza-
tion core with an interface for setting parameters and issuing queries, communicating
with the strategy components throughsockets.
Queries supported by the optimizationserver include:
Best Package Return the optimal package of goods, given current holdings and es-
timated or actual prices. This addresses the completion problem (Boyan and
Greenwald, 2001), which has come to be recognized as a core problem in TAC
bidding.3
Marginal Value Calculate the marginal (incremental) value of each additional unit
of available goods. The server accommodates separate queries for hotel and
entertainment goods.



































￿. The standardmarginal-valuequery forhotelsperformsthiscal-





￿. The marginal-value query for entertainment








Walverine predicts hotel prices based on a literal application of its presumption that
TAC markets are competitive. Speciﬁcally, it calculates the Walrasian competitive
equilibrium of the TAC economy, deﬁned as the set of prices at which all markets
2http://www.ilog.com
3Walverine’s best-package query actually solves a special case, the acquisition problem (Boyan and
Greenwald, 2001), as it accounts for opportunities to buy goods at (estimated) prices but neglects the pos-
sibility of selling entertainment. Note that our version employs linear prices, in contrast with the more
general priceline approach in which the agent faces varying estimated prices depending on the number of
units demanded.
4Several previous TAC agents employedsome concept of marginal value (Aurell et al., 2002; Stone and
Greenwald, 2003; Stone et al., 2001), although the technical deﬁnitions applied havevaried substantially.
6would clear, assuming all agents behave as price takers (Hildenbrand and Kirman,
1976). Since ﬂight prices are exogenous, it is only hotel prices that may adjust to bal-
ance supply and demand. Walverine attempts to ﬁnd a set of hotel prices that would
support such an equilibrium, and returns these values as its prediction for the hotels’
ﬁnal prices.
4.1 Calculating Competitive Equilibrium
Let























































Demand for a given hotel is a function of all hotel prices, as changing the price
of any hotel can affect the agent’s choice of trips, and thus the demand for any other
hotel. The interconnectionofmarkets renders thisa problemin generalequilibrium(as
opposed to partial equilibrium),and prevents us from analyzing each hotelin isolation.
Note that an agent’s demand also depends on ﬂight prices as well as its clients’
preferences. We leave these factors implicit in our notationsince both ﬂightprices and
preferences are considered constant with respect to the equilibrium calculation. We
provide full detail on our demand calculations in Section 4.2 below.
Prices
￿ constitutea competitive equilibriumif aggregate demand equals aggregate
supply for all hotels. Since there are 16 rooms available for each hotel on each day, we








General equilibriumtheory develops technical conditionson agent preferences un-
der which such an equilibrium can be guaranteed to exist (Hildenbrand and Kirman,
1976; Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, these conditions do not hold in the TAC en-
vironment, and indeed the TAC economy may not possess a competitive equilibrium.
Reasons include the fundamental discreteness and satiability of agents’ demands for
hotel rooms. Nevertheless, we may still expect to ﬁnd approximate equilibria (i.e.,
prices inducing relatively small imbalances of supply and demand), and these may
serve adequately for our prediction purpose.
The classic method for determining competitive prices is the tatonnement proto-
col, an iterative price adjustment procedure originally conceived by Walras (Arrow
and Hahn, 1971). Tatonnement begins with an arbitrary price vector, and revises price
elements respectively up or down as there is an excess of demand or supply. This pro-
cedure is guaranteed to converge on equilibrium prices when they exist, assuming in
addition that demand obeys the gross substitutesproperty (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In
the TAC domain, however, preferences for hotel rooms exhibit strong complementari-
ties. This represents a patent violationof gross substitutes, as raising the price for one
hotel can easily decrease demand for another, for example in the case of two hotels of
the same type on adjacent days.
Notwithstandingthese theoretical impediments, Walverine searches for a compet-
itive equilibrium using tatonnement. Starting from an initial guess
￿
￿,i titeratively






















7We experimented with several schemes for varying the adjustment rate
￿, settling
on an exponential decay. The process tended to converge quickly on an approximate
equilibrium,withno detectable sensitivityto particularparameter choices. The version















tatonnement for 300 iterations, although the bulk of the adjustment generally occurred
within the ﬁrst 10% of that.
4.2 Calculating Expected Demand
A central part of the tatonnement update (3) is determination of demand as a function
of prices. This is straightforward if client preferences are known, as it corresponds
essentially toan instance ofthe best-package query described inSection 3.3.5 Whereas
we do know the preferences of our own eight clients, we have no direct knowledge
about the 56 clients assigned to the other seven agents.
Therefore, we partition the demand problem into a component from Walverine
(
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￿ using a simpliﬁed version of the best-package query (ignoring






￿,w eattempt to estimate its expectation,
exploiting our knowledge of the distributionfrom which client preferences are drawn.




























































At the beginning of the game when there are no holdings of ﬂights and hotels, the
agent optimization problem is indeed separable by client, and so (4) is justiﬁed. At
interim points when agents hold goods, the demand optimizationproblem is no longer
separable. However, since we are ignorant about the holdings of other agents, we have
no particular basis on which to determine how (4) is violated, and so we adopt it as an
approximation.













￿. Our solution follows directly from






















































￿, the only remaining uncertainty surrounds the hotel premium hp.
We observe that the optimal choice of travel days is independent of hp, conditional
5Indeed, we originally validated our prediction concept by applying it to data from the TAC-01 ﬁnals,
taking the client preferencesas given.











￿ denote the optimal trip for the speciﬁed day pref-
erences, conditional on staying in hotel
￿ (T or S). We can calculate this trip by tak-
ing into account the ﬂight prices, prices for hotel
￿, day deviation penalties, and ex-









































￿, based on the factors above but not accounting for hp.










￿. Since T and S differ







































￿, then the choice of hotel depends on the actual hp. The





















Given the choice of trip days and hotel, the demand for this case is established.
We aggregate these cases (weightingby probabilityof hotel choice if applicable) using










combining with our own demand, ﬁnally, the overall expected demand estimate.
4.3 Expected Entertainment Surplus
The derivationabove deferred detailed explication of our accounting for entertainment
bonuses in evaluating alternative trips. We employ estimates of net entertainment con-
tribution as a function of arrival and departure days. Our analysis is based on the
distribution of client entertainment preferences, along with the empirical observation
(reported by the livingagents team (Fritschiand Dorer, 2002))that entertainmenttick-
ets tend to trade at a price near 80. We veriﬁed that this indeed obtained during the
TAC-01 ﬁnals, and reﬁned the estimate by distinguishing the entertainment tickets on
conjested days 2 and 3 (average price 85.49), from tickets on less conjested days 1 and
4( average price 76.35). Our analysis proceeds by assuming that agents can buy or sell
any desired quantity at these prices.
Consider a client staying for
￿ days, with given entertainment values. Its maximal
entertainment surplus would be obtained by allocating its most valuable ticket to the
cheapest day of its trip if proﬁtable (that is, if the entertainment value exceeds the
average price for that day), then if
￿
￿
￿, its second most valuable to the next cheapest
day, and ﬁnally, if
￿
￿
￿, its least valuable to a remaining day.
Let
￿
￿ denote the cost of the







































￿ denotes the expected value of allocatingthe
￿th most valuable ticketto a
daycosting
￿. Three ticketvaluesare drawnindependentlyfroma uniformdistribution.
9Expected Entertainment Surplus
Arrive:Depart TAC-01 Prices TAC-02 Prices
1:2, 4:5 74.7 78.1
1:3, 3:5 101.5 112.2
1:4, 2:5 106.9 120.1
1:5 112.7 121.0
2:3, 3:4 66.2 76.8
2:4 93.0 110.9
Table 1: Expected contributionsfrom entertainment, based on prices from TAC-01 and


































































































We need to determine the expected value of the
￿th ticket, net of its cost
￿. The
expected surplus of the
￿th order statistic with respect to
￿,g iven that

























































































































Usingthese expressions, wecan sum overthepossiblepositionsof
￿withrespect to
the order statistics (positionsinwhich value minus cost is positive)to ﬁnd the expected
value of allocating the



























































































The results of these calculations for each of the ten possible trips are presented in
Table 1. In the 2002 competition, Walverine used the average prices from the TAC-
01 ﬁnals. It turned out that the entertainment prices observed in the TAC-02 ﬁnals
were somewhat lower (averaging 74.18 on days 2 and 3, 72.79 on days 1 and 4), thus
supportinggreater entertainment surplus.
104.4 Interim Price Prediction
The description above covers Walverine’s procedure for initial price prediction. Once
the game is underway, there are several additionalfactors to consider.
￿ Agents already hold ﬂight and hotel goods.
￿ Flight prices have changed.
￿ Hotel auctions have issued price quotes, providinga source of informationabout
actual demand.
￿ Some hotel auctions are closed, precluding further acquisition of these rooms.
Walverine adopts a fairly minimal adjustment of its basic (initial) price prediction
method to address these factors. It continues to employ initial ﬂight prices in best-trip
calculations, and ignores its own ﬂight and hotel holdings in calculating own demand
for open hotels. For closed hotels, it does ﬁx its demand at actual holdings. Since we
do not know the holdings of other agents, we make no attempt to account for this in
estimating their demand. This applies even to closed hotels—in the absence of infor-
mation about their allocation, Walverine’s tatonnement calculations attempt to balance
supply and demand for these as well.
Given price quotes, we modify the price-adjustment process to employ ASK (or
ﬁnal price of closed auctions) as a lower-bound price for each hotel. This constraint is
enforced withineach iteration of the tatonnement update (3).
4.5 Prediction Quality
After the TAC-02 ﬁnals, we undertood a comprehensive comparative study of price-
prediction methods employed by the participating agents. The results of this study
are presented in a separate report (Wellman et al., 2002). Among other conclusions,
the investigation indicates that Walverine’s equilibrium method produced initial price
predictions more accurate than those of any other TAC-02 agent.
On the other hand, we did not systematically evaluate the quality of interim price
predictions, and suspect that Walverine has considerable room for improvement there.
In principle, price quotes provide signiﬁcant evidential value regarding uncertain de-
mand, and Walverine fails to exploit this informationdirectly in these terms.
5 Price Hedging
Walverine’s equilibrium analysis results in a point price prediction for each hotel auc-
tion. In reality, prices are inherently uncertain, and thus decisions about bidding and
trip choice should take into account the potential deviations from any point estimate.
Some agents, such as ATTac (Schapire et al., 2002)and RoxyBot(Greenwald, 2003b),
explicitly generate and use predictions in the form of distributionsover prices. Others,
including Walverine, generate point predictions but then make decisions with respect
to distributionsaround those estimates.
11The greatest source of risk stems from the possibility that a hotel’s price might
greatly exceed the estimate, causing the agent to pay a painfully high price or fail to
obtain its room(s). Thus, Walverine assigns a small outlier probability,
￿,t ot h eevent
that a given hotel will reach an unanticipated high price. In the event the hotel is an














￿ is the estimated price of the hotel
if it is not an outlier (i.e., according to the equilibrium price-prediction procedure,
described above). Walverine’s overall price distribution is thus deﬁned by a set of
disjoint events with exactly one outlier, at probability
￿ for each of the open hotel
auctions, and the residual probabilityfor the event of no outliers.
We apply this price distributionmodel in our initial calculation of optimal trips, on
which we base our startingﬂight purchases. The resultingchoice hedges for the poten-
tial that some price will deviate signiﬁcantly from our baseline prediction. The typical
effect of our hedging method is to reduce the duration of some trips, thus decreasing
Walverine’s exposure to hotel price risk.
Walverine’s optimizer employs this same outlier model in computing responses
to its hedged marginal value query. A hedged marginal value is simply a weighted
average of marginal values, where
￿
￿ is calculated with respect to each outlier event
(as well as the no-outlier event), with the results weighted according to the outlier
probability
￿. Because it involves repeated optimization with respect to a variety of
price and quantity combinations, hedged marginal value is the most computationally
intensive operation performed by Walverine.







one of the few free parameters in its ﬂight/hotel strategy, along with the outlier price
expression itself. Although we made no systematic effort to tune this parameter, we










was on the order of 300 points per game).
6 Optimal Bidding
An agent behavingcompetitivelywouldbidinhotelauctionsby offeringto buyunitsat
theirmarginalvalues. Againassumingseparable clients,thismeans thateach agentwill
submit an offer for a unit at marginal value for each hotel and each client. Under price
uncertainty, the bidding decision problem is more complicated (Greenwald, 2003b),
butacompetitive agent would stillnot take into account its own effect on prices.
Walverine assumes that other agents bid competitively and itself bids strategically
by calculating an optimal set of bids taking into account its own effect on hotel prices.
This amounts to placing bids that maximize our expected surplus given a distribution
from which other bids in the auction are drawn.
6.1 Generating Bid Distributions
As forour price-predictionalgorithm,we modelthe seven other agentsas 56individual
clients, again using the zero-holdings assumption to render the computation tractable.

























￿ is free, and
the best trip of the alternative hotel type
￿
￿.I nother words, the value of a given room
is estimated to be the price above which the client would prefer to switch to their best
trip using the alternate hotel type.
Setting the price of (
￿
￿















































￿,w esay that val
￿ is zero,6













































































































































































￿ are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the corresponding
uniform distributionof (8).




























Finally, it will also prove useful to deﬁne a valuation distribution conditional on
exceeding a given value

























6.2 Computing Optimal Bids
Afterestimatingabiddistribution,Walverinederivesanoptimalsetofbidswithrespect













￿ where these are apparentfrom context.
13represents the probability that a given value
￿ would be
￿th highest if inserted into a
set of










































ditional valuationdistribution(9) for Val in the deﬁnition above.
Oncehotelauctionsstartissuingpricequotes,we have additionalinformationabout
the distributionof bids. If
￿ is the hypotheticalquantitywon for Walverine at the time




￿ bids from other














￿ at or below (assuming a bid
from every client, including zero bids). We therefore deﬁne another order statistic,
!
￿, corresponding to the













￿ bids from Val.
Note that our order statistics are deﬁned in terms of other agents’ bids, but we are
generally interestedinthe
￿thhighestvalue inan auctionoverall. Let
￿
￿ be the number
of our bids in the auction greater than
￿.W ed e ﬁne
!
￿ so as to include our own bids,
















Given our deﬁnitions, the probability that a bid
￿ will be the













































We characterize the expected value of submitting a bid at price
￿ as a combination











































































￿: Median price if we do not bid.
Before proceeding, we assess the qualityof our model, by computing the probabil-












to be invalid and we revert to our most conservative bid: our own marginal value.
If the conditional bid distribution passes our test, based on these statistics we can
evaluate the expected utility
￿
￿ of a candidate bid for a given unit, taking into con-
sideration the marginal value
"
￿ of the unit to Walverine, and the number of units
￿
￿ of this good for which we have bids greater than
￿. Expected utility of a bid also
reﬂects the expected price that will be paid for the unit, as well as the expected effect
the bid will have on the price paid for all our higher bids in this auction. Lacking an
14expression for expected prices conditionalon bidding,we employ as an approximation





















































































Uponcalculatingdesired offerprices forall unitsofa givenhotel,Walverine assembles
them into an overall bid vector for the auction, taking the beat-the-quote rule (BTQ)
into consideration. BTQ dictates that if the hypothetical quantity won for an agent’s
current bid is
￿,a ny replacement bid for that auction must represent an offer to buy at
least
￿ unitsat a price at least ASK
￿


















then the agent is winning its ﬁrst two units (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿ ). To satisfy BTQ, the agent’s























￿ be the agent’s current bid for the eight potentially valuable




￿corresponds to no offer for that unit), and let
￿
￿ be the
proposed new bid, derived according to the optimization procedure above (11). To









































































￿ (equal to the agent’s lowest winning bid),














￿.I nthis situation, the agent would like to revise
upward its offer for the ﬁrst unit, but would prefer that its offer of 150 for the second
unit were outbid by another agent. Considering that other agents also follow BTQ,
there will likelybe several new bids at a price of ASK
￿
￿in the next round of bidding,
meaning that an unrevised bid of 150 stands a much better chance of being outbid
than does a revised bid of 151. In this case, the agent must balance the desirability
of revising its bid for the ﬁrst unit against its aversion to increasing its offer for the
second.
Walverine decides whether to revise its bid based on a crude comparison of these
factors. It assesses the value of bidding in terms of the magnitude of its desired price
changes that are allowed by BTQ, and the cost of bidding in terms of the amount
by which BTQ requires bidding above actual value. If this latter value exceeds the





7Ofﬂine analysis using Monte Carlo simulation veriﬁed that the approximationis reasonable.
156.4 Analysis
Using game data from the TAC-02 ﬁnals, we tested the utilityof our biddingalgorithm
as well as the accuracy of the bid distributions.
Informal analysis reveals that our distributions systematically underestimate the
actual values of the bids. It appears that the distributions are fairly accurate during
the initial stages of the game, when our modeling assumptions hold (zero holdings,
all auctions open). The deterioration in accuracy of our distributions is not a fatal
problem, as our algorithm reverts to bidding marginal values when the observed price
quote is judged too unlikely with respect to our estimates. Of course, more accurate
distributionswouldenable more effective bid optimization.
Toward this end we devised an alternative bid estimation scheme, intended to cor-
rect for some of the invalid simplifying assumptions underlying our original method. 8
It turned out that, for the TAC-02 ﬁnals at least, the alternative distributions more
closely resemble the actual distributionof bids.
To test whether the more accurate estimates actually supportimproved bidding,we
devised a measure based on past data that determines the effectiveness of a set of bids
with respect to predicted prices and other agents’ actual bids. For each open hotel
in each bidding round, we calculated our winnings in that auction based on various
bidding strategies and the actual bids placed by other agents. We then scored each hy-
potheticaloutcome undertheassumptionthatroomsinotheropenhotelswere available
at predicted prices.
We used this method to score bids over 256 closings(32 games times eight bidding
rounds)fromtheTAC-02ﬁnals, generating1152data points(4.5openhotelsinaverage
bidding round). Surprisingly, bidding based on our original, nominally less accurate
distributions produced superior results, to both marginal-value bidding and bidding
based on the more accurate new distribution. However, a mean-difference test did not
reveal the differences to be statistically signiﬁcant. Future work will further test and
reﬁne our model of other agents’ bid distributions.
7 Entertainment Trading
Walverine’sapproach toentertainmenttradingcan be consideredapolaroppositeofthe
competitive analysis approach it takes to ﬂight and hotel buying. Equilibrium analysis
has littletosay aboutthedynamics ofprices producedthroughcontinuousauctions, yet
these transient behaviors seem particularly salient for effective entertainment trading.
Thus, for this domain, we employ no model of the market, and no explicit calcula-
tions of the expected outcomes of alternative bid choices. Instead, Walverine adopts a
model-free, empirical approach called Q-learning—avariety ofreinforcement learning
(Sutton and Barto, 1998).
8We forgo detailed speciﬁcation, as this redesigneffort is still in ﬂux.
167.1 Learning Framework
The idea of applying Q-learning to TAC strategies was proposed by Boadway and
Precup (2001), and employed in their TAC-01 entry. This agent attempted to learn a
policy for the entire TAC game, but this proved too ambitious given the time available
for development and training. Inspired by their example, we sought to pursue this
approach for the much more limited TAC task of entertainment trading.








the value of taking a given action in a given state. Value is typically measured by
(discounted) cumulative future rewards, and the function can be represented in tabu-
lar or implicit form. From the
$ function one can derive an optimal policy, namely
that performing the maximally valued action in any given state. The recurrence (Bell-
man) equation relatingvalues of adjacent states provides the basis for updating
$ from
experience of taking actions and observing state transitionsand rewards.
Walverine’s entertainment component considers each auction independently. We
approximate the state of an entertainment auction as the settings of six parameters:







￿), and game time. To keep the state space manageable, we discretized
these dimensions into value sets of size 6, 6, 3, 7, 7, and 3, respectively. Marginal
values provided by the optimizer summarized client preferences and provided the nec-
essary link to our ﬂight/hotelmodule.
The reward from entertainment has two components: cash ﬂow from trading and
the entertainment bonus accrued to clients at the end of the game.
In each entertainment auction, Walverine maintains an offer to buy one unit, and
an offer to sell one unit (at a higher price, of course). Rather than take the offer prices
as actions, however, we deﬁne the action space in terms of offsets from marginalvalue.
That is, the action buy
￿
￿













￿.W ed e ﬁned eight discrete
offset values. However, rather than consider all 64 buy/sell combinations, Walverine
alternates between buy and sell decisions, considering only the eight available options
for each case.
7.2 Learning Results
Our learning procedure encodes
$ as a table. Walverine maintained two tables: one
for entertainment events on days
￿1,4
￿, and the other for days
￿2,3
￿.W ithin each
category (six auctions apiece), the learning agent shared its trading experience. Given
the size of each table (6291 states and 16 actions9), Walverine required a great deal of
training experience. We ran the Q-learning algorithm over data gathered from 14,839
games, including matches against other TAC participants during preliminary rounds,
as well as many instances of self-play. Walverine employed a variety of entertainment
trading policies while gathering experience, including a hard-coded strategy based on
that reportedlyemployed by livingagents inTAC-01 (Fritschiand Dorer, 2002). Once
9There are 15,876distinct combinationsof state variables, but manyof thesedo notrepresentlegalstates.
In all of its training, Walverine actually experienced 2588 and 2602 states, respectively, in the two auction
categories.
17we had accumulated sufﬁcient data, we ran some instances of Walverine based on
preliminary learned policies, with various exploration-exploitationcontrol methods.
Figure 2 displays a learning curve representing the evolution of Walverine’s enter-
tainment performance during the training period. We took as a baseline the value of
the null(no-trading)strategy, whichwe determined experimentallytoprovidean enter-
tainment reward (through retaining endowed tickets) of 1019 on average. As a second
baseline, we evaluated the performance of the aforementioned livingagents entertain-
ment strategy, embedded in Walverine. The performance axis of Figure 2 measures
Walverine’s learned entertainment strategy compared to this second baseline. In each
interval of training games represented, we evaluate the policy learned based on games
prior to that interval (thus the ﬁrst interval represents the no-trading baseline). The
evaluation consists of self-play games with half the agents followingthe learned enter-
tainment policy and the other half following the livingagents entertainment strategy.
By the time of the TAC-02 ﬁnals, we had reached within 50 points of the hand-coded
strategy.


















Figure 2: Entertainment learning curve.
It is important to note that Walverine itself underwent many changes during the
learning process, which undoubtedly confounds the results. Moreover, the policies
evaluated in Figure 2 retain an exploration element, except the last interval, which is
pure exploitation.
In the TAC-02 ﬁnals, Walverine averaged an entertainment reward of 1409, nearly
400 over the non-biddingbaseline. A summary of entertainment performance by agent
is included in Table 2. Interestingly, whitebear, the high scorer in TAC-02, was ex-
tremely successful on entertainment, achieving an average reward of 1623. Although
Vetsikas and Selman (2003)reportemployinga simple entertainment strategy, the high
payoff achieved suggests that there may be room for improvement through further
learning in this environment.
18Agent Final score CP Adj Ent
whitebear 3413 +66 1623
SouthamptonTAC 3385 -48 1464
Thalis 3246 -36 1393
UMBCTAC 3236 +55 1327
Walverine 3210 +67 1409
livingagents10 3181 -20 1362
kavayaH 3099 -60 1460
cuhk 3069 -24 1452
Table 2: Scores during the ﬁnals. Each agent played 32 games. The second column
represents our calculated adjustment due to client preference assignments. The third
column presents the entertainment component of agent scores.
8T A C-02 Agent Performance
8.1 Tournament Results
Average scores for the eight agents that played in the ﬁnal round are posted in Table 2.
See http://www.sics.se/tacfor a listof participantafﬁliationsand team lead-
ers, as well as results from preliminary and semiﬁnal rounds. Complete game logs are
available, as for the previous TAC events.
Performance in the tournament is one relevant measure of agent quality, although
we agree withthose who have cautionedagainst focusingexcessively onranked results
in the context of research competitions (Stone, 2002). One interesting question is how
to measure progress over time. The two top-scoring agents in TAC-01, livingagents
and ATTac-2001, participated withessentially unchanged agents in TAC-02. As noted
above, livingagents did quite well, assuming we ignore the bug that caused it to skip
two games. ATTac was top scorer in the TAC-02 seeding rounds, but then was elimi-
nated in the semiﬁnals. One possible explanation is that prices during the preliminary
roundsin 2002(whichATTac uses as trainingdata) were notsufﬁcientlyrepresentative
of the ﬁnal rounds. However, we believe it is also reﬂective of a general increase in
competence of the other agents in the ﬁeld.
The twotop-scoringagents inTAC-02, whitebear andSouthamptonTAC(He and
Jennings,2002),alsocontendedinTAC-01. These agents reportedlyevolvedfromtheir
2001 designs, improved throughadoptingreﬁned classiﬁcations of game environments
(He and Jennings, 2003), and throughextensive experimentation and parameter tuning
(Vetsikas and Selman, 2003).
10The score of livingagents was adverselyaffected bymissing two games. Discountingthese wouldhave
led to an averagescore of 3393.
19Round Global TAC Market TAC (%) Uniform H+E (%) Endowed E (%)
Qualify 618 415 67.0 95.2 85.4
Seeding 618 470 75.7 95.2 85.4
Semi-Final 608 534 87.7 95.2 85.5
Final 609 542 89.1 94.6 85.0
Table 3: The efﬁciency of the TAC market compared to the global optimum. Global
optimization with uniform allocation of hotel and entertainment to agents is reported
as a benchmark, as is a second benchmark with uniform hotel allocation and no enter-
tainment trading.
8.2 TAC Market Efﬁciency
Another gauge of agent effectiveness is how well they allocate travel goods, in the ag-
gregate, through their market interactions. We can measure this by comparing actual
TAC market allocations with ideal global allocations. Consider the total group of 64
clients, and the set of available resources: 16 hotel rooms of each type per day, plus 8
entertainment tickets of each type per day. The global optimizer calculates the alloca-
tionofresources maximizingtotalclientutility,netofexpenditures onﬂightsassuming
they are available at their initial prices. Note that this optimization neglects hotel and
entertainment prices, as these are endogenous to the TAC market. The average achiev-
able net utility, per client, in the various rounds of the TAC tournament as determined
by global optimization is reported under the heading “Global” in Table 3. Average net
utility achieved in the actual TAC games (also neglecting hotel and entertainment ex-
penditures, but countingactual payments for ﬂights) is reported under “TAC Market”.
As seen in the table, we found that the TAC market achieved 89% of the optimal
value, onaverage, overthe32games oftheTAC-02ﬁnals. There was asteady improve-
ment from the qualifying round (67% optimal), seeding round (76%), and semiﬁnals
(88%). It is difﬁcultto assess this effectiveness in absolute terms, so we provide a cou-
ple of benchmarks for comparison. In “Uniform H+E”, we distribute the hotel rooms
and entertainment evenly across the eightagents, then optimize each agent’s allocation
to clients. This approach yields 95% of the globally optimal value. The relative value
drops to around 85% if we distributeonly the hotels, leaving agents with their original
endowment of entertainment. It is perhaps surprising that simply dividing the goods
uniformlyachieves sucha highfractionoftheavailablesurplus—betterthanthe market
if entertainment is included in the distribution.
One reason that the uniform distributionis relatively so effective is that the agents
are ex ante symmetric, with i.i.d. clients. Potential gains from trade are thus not so
great for hotels. Second, a direct allocation avoids the signiﬁcant obstacles posed to
agents pursuing their allotments individuallythroughthe market. Agents face substan-
tial risk (price uncertainty, exposure due to complementarities, unknown hotel closing
patterns), and this necessarily entails some loss in expected allocation quality. For
example, the set of available hotels is sufﬁcient to obtain trips for all clients (albeit
shortened from desired lengths), and given a deﬁnite allocation the agent can optimize
for its clients accordingly. With uncertainty, the agents may plan for longer trips than
20are jointlyfeasible, and thus wind up wasting ﬂights, hoarding hotel rooms (to hedge),
or resorting to suboptimal fallback trip options. In future work, we will investigate in
greater depth the various sources of misallocation in TAC play.
9 Conclusions
The hallmark of Walverine’s approach is its basis in competitive analysis of the TAC
travel economy. Walverine displays this characteristic most directly in its use of Wal-
rasian competitive equilibrium to predict hotel prices, and its method for optimal bid-
ding, which relies on the competitive property in its model of other agent’s bids. The
agent’s hotel and ﬂight biddingstrategy is decision-analyticto the core, as every action
is based on an explicit optimizationwith respect to its model assumptions.
As designers, we avoided empirical parameter tuning, except in the case of enter-
tainment bidding, where we ceded all discretion to an automatic learning procedure.
(Admittedly, we exercised subjective judment in formulatingthe learning problem, in-
evitably introducingsome bias.) Our aim is to enable sharper evaluation of our funda-
mental hypothesisregarding the utilityof competitive analysis.
Although the results cannot be deﬁnitive, we regard Walverine’s TAC-02 experi-
ence as broad validationof itsunderlyingapproach. More focused studies, forexample
on initialprice prediction (Wellman et al., 2002), are need to evaluate speciﬁc compo-
nents of the agent’s strategy. There is clearly room for improvement; in particular
we have identiﬁed interim price prediction and modeling for optimal bidding as areas
where Walverine failsto exploitavailable information. We intendtopursue such topics
in preparing for future competitions in the TAC series.
Planning for TAC-03 is well underway. The 2003 tournament will include a di-
vision devoted to the travel-shopping game described here (now dubbed “TAC Clas-
sic”), and will also introduce a new game involving trading multi-faceted goods in a
supply-chain context. This new game will introduceseveral interestingstrategic issues
not emphasized in TAC Classic. We hope that many of the agent researchers inter-
ested in trading domains will participate in one or both of these games, and ﬁnd it—as
we have—a stimulating and fertile environment for developing and evaluating novel
trading-agent techniques.
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